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Abstract. In this article, the problem of transworld identity – that is the question, if and how it is possible to 
ground the intuition that the same individual exists in more than one possible world – is solved by arguing 
that individuals have essences. First of all, it is claimed that the concept of transworld identity is desirable 
since it betters both global pan-essentialism and counterpart theory. Then, necessary terminology for suc-
cessful understanding of the transworld identity problem is introduced. Afterwards, it is contended that the 
well-known Chisholm’s paradox for transworld identity can be resolved by appealing to individual essences. 
It is argued that if extreme haecceitism is true, then essences of individuals are non-qualitative and hence 
haecceitist switches are ontologically grounded. On the other hand, if reductionism is true, then essences of 
individuals are qualitative and hence haecceitist switches are impossible. Finally, it is shown that by referring 
to individual essences across possible worlds it is possible to solve the problem of cross-world identification.
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Tarppasaulinės tapatybės problema:  
esencialistinės perspektyvos pranašumai
Santrauka. Straipsnyje tarppasaulinės tapatybės problema – t. y. klausimas, ar ir kaip yra įmanoma pagrįsti 
intuiciją, jog individas egzistuoja keliuose galimuose pasauliuose – yra sprendžiama argumentuojant, kad 
individai turi esmes. Visų pirma, teigiama, jog tarppasaulinės tapatybės samprata yra pageidautina, kadangi ji 
pranašesnė už globalų panesencializmą ir antrininkų teoriją. Tuomet įvedama būtina terminologija, kuri leidžia 
sėkmingai suprasti tarppasaulinės tapatybės problemą. Straipsnyje teigiama, kad įžymus Chisholmo paradoksas 
tarppasaulinei tapatybei gali būti išspręstas nurodant, jog individai turi esmes. Jeigu galimi pasauliai gali skirtis 
vieni nuo kitų vien nekokybiniu būdu (in a non-qualitative way), tuomet individų esmės yra nekokybinės, tad 
skirtumas tarp netapačių galimų pasaulių, kurie kokybiškai yra vienodi (qualitatively the same), yra ontologiškai 
pagrįstas. Kita vertus, jei redukcionizmas yra tiesa, tai individų esmės yra kokybinės, tad netapatūs galimi 
pasauliai, kurie kokybiškai yra vienodi, yra neįmanomi. Taip pat įrodinėjama, kad tarppasaulinė identifikacijos 
problema gali būti išspręsta nurodant į tai, jog galima referuoti į esmes kituose galimuose pasauliuose.
Pagrindiniai žodžiai: tarppasaulinė tapatybė, esencializmas, Chisholmo paradoksas, identifikacijos kriterijus, 
kokybiškumo perskyra
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When Science is faced with the demand 
– as if it were an acid test it could not pass – 
that it should deduce, construct, find a priori, 
or however it is put, something called “this thing” 
 or “this one man”, it is reasonable that the demand 
should say which “this thing”, or which “this particular 
 man” is meant; but it is impossible to say this. 
Hegel. Phenomenology of Spirit, §102
What is an individual? A very good question. 
 So good, in fact, that we should not even try to 
 answer it. We could assume that being an individual 
 is a primitive concept – that is harmless: any 
sufficiently clear concept can be made primitive.
Dana Scott. Advice on Modal Logic: 144
1. Introduction
We find ourselves surrounded by individuals. Perhaps some of them could have been 
otherwise. As it happens, in the actual world this dog is courageous but had a possible 
world where this dog is timid been the case, then this very dog would have been timid. 
Existing in the actual world, this dog also exists according to another possible world, 
i.e. it is a transworld individual. In this article, two problems of transworld identity are 
addressed. (i) The metaphysical problem of transworld identity, due to Chisholm (1967), 
is a question – if there are haecceitist switches, then what grounds them? Although typ-
ically, one can straightforwardly accept non-qualitative individual essences to solve it, 
a novel rectification of Chisholm’s paradox, one that is not partisan with respect as to 
whether individual essences are qualitative or not, will be offered. Since it is metaphys-
ically contentious whether individual essences are qualitative or not, one should take it 
as a virtue that one can find non-binding grounds to solve this paradox. (ii) An epistemic/
semantic problem of transworld identity, due to Kaplan (1967/1979), is a question of 
identification of individuals across possible worlds – how can one determine that an in-
dividual in one possible world is one and the same as the individual in another possible 
world? It will be shown how the standard solution to this problem, viz. acknowledging 
the fact that one can stipulate that one is considering a possible world where such and 
such individual exists (Kripke 1980: 42-53), is compatible with the proposed solution 
to Chisholm’s paradox. 
First of all, reasons for accepting transworld identity are given (section 2). Then, 
necessary terminology for dealing with problems of transworld identity is introduced 
(section 3). Afterwards, Chisholm’s paradox (section 4) and the problem of transworld 
identification (section 5) are discussed and resolved.
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2. Reasons for Transworld Identity
Mathematical models for first-order alethic modal logics do not express anything about 
modal metaphysics. One could take W to be the set of apples, instead of the set possible 
worlds, and still do the mathematics equally well1. Hence, if one wants to understand 
what it takes for an individual to exist across members of W, then one has to provide an 
account of the nature of possible worlds and one has to intend that W is, nothing more or 
less than, the set of those things. 
Possible worlds are maximal state of affairs. States of affairs are somewhat a blue-
print for reality to be somehow. Some states of affairs include other states of affairs, e.g. 
Socrates being seated and Saul Kripke writing a paper on formal logic include state 
of affairs Socrates being seated, because if the former state of affairs obtains (i.e., is 
actual), then the latter does also. Similarly, one state of affairs can exclude another state 
of affairs, e.g. 2+2=4 excludes the state of affairs 2+2≠4, because if the former state of 
affairs obtains, then the latter does not. One can capture the maximality in question by 
defining the possible world as:
POSSIBLE WORLDdef = is a state of affairs S1, such that for any state of affairs S2, 
S1 either includes S2 or excludes S2.
It should be kept in mind that, possible worlds are not propositions since the former 
do not and the latter do, have truth-value. Also, any possible world is not the world itself, 
for “cosmos cannot itself be identical with any way the cosmos could have been: to say 
this would be like saying that Socrates is identical with the way Socrates is, which is plain 
bad grammar” (Inwagen 1980: 406)2. 
When analyzing de re modality, one naturally (although not necessarily) encounters 
individuals that exist across possible worlds, i.e. cases of transworld identity. Minimal3 
transworld identity can be defined as:
MINIMAL TRANSWORLD IDENTITYdef = there are individuals I1 and I2 such 
that, I1 exists in a possible world w1, I2 exists in a possible world w2 (w1≠w2), and I1 
is (numerically) identical to I2.4
1  Interpretation of W as the set of apples is an example offered by Timothy Williamson (2013: 85).
2  Generally, this construal of possible worlds is in the spirit of Kripke (1980: 15-20, 42-52); Adams (1974); 
Salmon (1989: 5-7); Plantinga  (1974: ch. 4; 1976).
3  In the sense that it requires the least ontological commitment. 
4  Say that: x exists in a possible world w iff it is impossible for w to obtain and x to not exist. What is identity? 
Well, since I do not believe that there is any satisfactory definition of it, the following explication hopefully proves to 
be enough: “[i]dentity is utterly simple and unproblematic. Everything is identical to itself; nothing is ever identical 
to anything else except itself. There is never any problem about what makes something identical to itself; nothing 
can ever fail to be. And there is never any problem about what makes two things identical; two things never can be 
identical” (Lewis 1986: 192-193).
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If one defines necessary (or essential)5 property of individual as:
X HAS P NECESSARILYdef = in all possible worlds w, if x exists in w, then x has P,
then it is not the case that an individual exists across possible worlds only if one 
assumes that all properties of that individual are necessarily had by it. Following Roca-
Royce (2011: 67), call this position pan-essentialism. If pan-essentialism is true for all 
individuals, then one has a stronger position called global pan-essentialism.
GLOBAL PAN-ESSENTIALISMdef = for all x and for any property P, if x has P, 
then x has P in all possible worlds where x exists.
Then, the fact that some individuals do have accidental properties implies the claim 
that there are genuine cases of transworld identity. 
X HAS P ACCIDENTALLYdef = there is a possible world w1, such that, x exists in 
w1 and x has P therein, and there is a possible world w2 (w1≠w2), such that, x exists in 
w2 and x does not have P therein.
There is at least one case of transworld identity if and only if there is some individual 
I such that it has some property P accidentally6. Also, if there exists an individual I such 
that it has some properties accidentally, then global pan-essentialism is false. Therefore, 
minimal transworld identity implies the negation of global pan-essentialism. The same 
is true in another direction, i.e. if pan-essentialism is true, then there are no individuals 
with accidental properties and, hence, no transworld identity.
Reasons for accepting transworld identity can now be given by a Moorean flavor7 
argument:
(1) One does know that Socrates could have been a poet.
(2) If one does not know whether there are any cases of transworld identity, then one 
does not know whether it is the case that, Socrates could have been a poet.
hence,
(3) One does know that there are cases of transworld identity (from (1), (2) and M.T.)8.
5  In this article, “essential” and “necessary” are used interchangeably.
6  It should be intuitively clear that the above is true. But if proof is wanted one can prove it as follows: for 
right-to-left: it follows from the definitions. For left-to-right: if minimal transworld identity is true, then there are two 
distinct possible worlds, such that in them the same individual exists. If two possible worlds are distinct, then there 
is at least one proposition that is true in one world but it is not true at another (otherwise, per impossibile, it would 
be the same world after all). Call this proposition “p”. But then, the individual in question has a property “existing 
in a world where p is true” accidentally. Hence, some property is accidental to this individual. 
7  Moorean because it uses, what has been by William Rowe (1979: 339) called, Moorean shift. Take two forms 
of arguments: I. p, q ∴ r; and II. not-r, q ∴ not-p, then “[t]o argue against the first premise (p) by constructing the 
counter-argument II is to employ the G. E. Moore shift” (ibid.).
8  Usually, in the history of philosophy, only Leibniz is recognized as holding global pan-essentialism to be true. 
On the other hand, for a defense of a claim that Leibniz’s views are compatible with transworld identity, see 
Cover and Hawthorne (1992).
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Although this argument against global pan-essentialism is both, sound and valid, there 
is an elephant in the room not yet mention, i.e. David Lewis. Lewis’s contention is that 
there are more horns than two: global pan-essentialism and transworld identity do not 
exhaust the logical space.
He suggests that the correct analysis of de re modality should use the logic of similarity 
and not one of identity. Individuals can (and do) have accidental and necessary properties 
but it has nothing to do with their being such and such in some possible world. What 
matters is whether or not counterparts of individuals exist and have the relevant properties 
in some accessible possible worlds. One can say that:
something has for counterpart at a given world those things existing there that resemble it 
closely enough in important respects of intrinsic quality and extrinsic relations, and that re-
semble it no less closely than do other things existing there (Lewis 1973: 39).
So, for example, some counterpart of Humphrey by winning an election guarantees 
that it is true in our world that Humphrey could have won the election (Lewis 1986: 194). 
Lewis’s thesis of counterpart theory is directly related to his thesis of modal realism, 
i.e. the thesis that every possible world is as real as ours. If other worlds are as real as 
ours, then it is not tempting to accept that there is any overlapping between domains of 
any possible worlds9. In the remainder of this section reasons against Lewis’s counterpart 
theory are given.
OBJECTION I: it seems that counterpart theory just does not provide correct analysis 
of de re modal statements. Consider an obviously true statement:
(4) Socrates is essentially self-identical.
According to counterpart theory, proposition (4) is true if and only if all counterparts 
of Socrates are, on the one hand, identical with themselves (viz. all of them have the 
property λx(x=x)) and, on the other hand, if they are identical-with-Socrates, i.e. Socrates 
in w010 (viz. all of them have the property λx(x=Socrates)). But even if all Socrates coun-
terparts pass the “being-identical-with-themselves” test (so to speak), none of them pass 
the “being-identical-with-Socrates” test. Therefore, according to the counterpart theory, 
one should say that it is not true that (4)11. It should be obvious that this gives reason to 
think that counterpart theory provides the wrong analysis of de re modal statements and 
not that the poor Socrates is no longer essentially self-identical. 
9  Lewis contends that, if one is modal realist, then one should not accept overlap because of the problem of 
accidental intrinsics. It is claimed that, if one accepts overlap, then one cannot account accidental intrinsics, e.g. 
having five-fingered hand. That is so because, in order to avoid a plain contradiction of claiming that an individual is 
both five-fingered and six-fingered, either one has to claim that such intrinsic properties are in fact relations to pos-
sible worlds, but then intrinsic properties are relations, or, one has to accept that all intrinsic properties are essential, 
but then Humphrey is essentially five-fingered. Both options are unacceptable according to Lewis (1986: 198-209). 
On the other hand, there are proponents of modal realism with overlap, for example Kris McDaniel (2004) and Sam 
Cowling (2011: 128-158). Note that, the critique of modal realism that follows will be confined to Lewis’s version 
of it. McDaniel’s and Cowling’s positions are objectionable, but that would require more writing space to show.
10 Where w0 stands for the actual world.
11 For a similar critique, see Plantinga (1974: 110-114).
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OBJECTION II: it seems that counterpart theory, by requiring us to reject any over-
lapping domains of possible worlds, collapses into global pan-essentialism. Simply put, 
everything existing in one world exists in that one world only. Therefore, if Socrates himself 
would have had different properties exemplified, it would no longer have been Socrates. 
But then, he has all of his properties in all worlds where he exists essentially. Hence one 
should agree with Nathan Salmon, that counterpart theory “is, at the bottom, just a par-
ticularly inflexible brand of essentialism” (Salmon 1982: 236). If that is the case, then the 
argument given against global pan-essentialism is as valid against counterpart theory12.
In this section, the main alternatives to the idea of transworld identity were discussed 
It was argued that transworld identity betters both global pan-essentialism and counterpart 
theory. Before scrutinizing problems of transworld identity and offering an essentialist 
solution to them (section 4 and 5), it is necessary to introduce additional terminology 
(section 3).
3. Books, Ramsification and a Qualitative Distinction
Some propositions are true in some worlds but not in others, e.g. it is true that Socrates 
is snub-nosed in w0, but there are worlds where that is not the case. Now, associating 
every possible world w with a set of true propositions in w gives a set called the book 
on w – B(w). The truth of the conjunction of all members in set B(w) is grounded in w 
obtaining. Because books are maximal they correspond to possible worlds one-to-one: for 
one possible world there exists one book of true propositions and vice versa13.
Ramsification on a book is a function, such that14: (i) it takes as an input a book on a 
world and (ii) for each constant symbol used in that book replaces that constant with a 
unique variable, and (iii) it attaches corresponding existential quantifiers. Call the result 
of this function – R(B(w)).
Now one can make a qualitative distinction:
QUALITATIVE PROPERTYdef = any property such that it is expressible by some 
n-place predicate that occurs in some R(B(w)). 
12 One might notice that this objection is in some sense illicit, i.e. it presupposes what it sets out to prove. I 
can only point out that I use the words Socrates himself to mean Socrates himself. If Lewis wishes to analyze the 
meaning of those words in his own way, I can only concede that I mean something else by them. Nonetheless, the 
objection is at least as feasible as Quine’s objection against McX (1948: 22), viz. in the same way as one does not 
mean by Pegasus and idea of Pegasus, so one does not mean by Socrates himself could have done so and so, that 
someone similar to Socrates does so and so in some possible world. Of course, both Lewis and McX have possible 
comebacks, but, for the present purposes, nothing substantial is at stake, since OBJECTION I still does the job. For 
further exploration of this objection against counterpart theory, see Plantinga (1974: 116-118) and Salmon (1982: 
236), for a closely related critique, see Kripke (1980: 45/n13). Thanks to the anonymous referee for point out the 
circularity of this objection.
13 Two notes on books. Set of propositions is maximal iff no proposition can be added to this set without render-
ing it inconsistent. Secondly, in the context of this paper, parsimony is not an issue, hence there are no methods given 
that would lessen the number of members in books.
14 For a more general account of Ramsification, see Lewis (1970).
MOKSLO ISTORIJA IR FILOSOFIJA Pranciškus Gricius. The Problem of Transworld Identity: in Defence of Essentialism
93
NON-QUALITATIVE PROPERTYdef = any property such that it is not expressible 
by any n-place predicate that occurs in some R(B(w)).
Of course, it might be the case that, one in principle cannot understand some qualit-
ative properties without understanding some non-qualitative properties (i.e. one can be 
sense-dependent on another), but that need not mean that those qualitative properties are 
ontologically dependent on those non-qualitative properties in question (i.e. it might be that 
they are referent-independent)15. Hence, all arguments of the following kind are mistaken:
(5) It is possible that Kripke weighs twice as much as Socrates in w0.
(6) In some possible world w1 Kripke has a property P (where P – “weighs twice as 
much as Socrates in w0” and hence P(Kripke) is true only if Kripke and Socrates 
stand in relation R, when xRy reads “x is such that it weighs twice as much as y in 
w0”).
Therefore,
(7) P is non-qualitative.
But it is quite obvious that P is qualitative since there is such a predicate in some 
R(B(w) such that it expresses the property in question, e.g. if Socrates in w0 weighs 100kg, 
then the property in question is “weighs 200kg”16. Therefore, qualitative properties are 
only those that are not referent-dependent on non-qualitative properties (and vice versa).
Each R(B(w)) is a very long first-order sentence that assigns to every x a set of qualitat-
ive properties that are exemplified by that x in a corresponding possible world. Therefore, 
every R(B(w)) has one world-class (C), when world-class is a class of sets of qualitative 
properties. For every S, such that S is a set of qualitative properties and S ∈ C, it is the 
case that this set of qualitative properties is exemplified by some x in a possible world 
corresponding to C. One can capture the idea of qualitative profile by saying: every S is 
a qualitative profile of some x in a possible world corresponding to C17. 
For any R(B(w)) (or C), the most important remaining question is: does it correspond 
to one or to many possible worlds? Or, if put otherwise, could there be two distinct pos-
sible worlds, such that Ramsification of their books results in the same R(B(w))? Define 
successful and unsuccessful Ramsification as:
RAMSIFICATION IS SUCCESSFULdef = each R(B(w)) corresponds to one and 
only one possible world (and vice versa).
RAMSIFICATION IS UNSUCCESSFULdef = it is not the case that it is successful.
15 Notions of sense-dependence and referent-dependence are taken from Robert Brandom. He uses them in a dif-
ferent context, viz. to explicate, what Brandom takes as, Hegel’s idea that alethic modal notions are sense-dependent 
(but not referent-dependent) on norm-governed activities, see Brandom (2005: 430-431), (2019: 83-85).
16 On the other hand, think of the fact that Socrates weight is certainly not so neatly cut as to be exactly 100kg.
17 Idea of world-class is suggested by Kenneth Siegel (1975: 75-78). Although he does not treat it in light of 
Ramsification. 
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(Un)successfulness of Ramsification depends on the very nature of reality. One can 
locate two metaphysical positions:
EXTREME HAECCEITISMdef = reality is such that it is not necessary for Ramsi-
fication to be successful.
and, on the other hand,
REDUCTIONISMdef = reality is such that it is necessary for Ramsification to be 
successful18.
In this section, necessary terminology for further investigation was given. In section 4, 
the problem of transworld identity emerging from Chisholm’s paradox is scrutinized 
and resolved by appeal to individual essences. In section 5, the problem of cross-world 
identification is analyzed and untangled by arguing for the appropriateness of reference 
to individual essences across possible worlds.
4. Essentialist Solution to Chisholm’s Paradox
Chisholm’s paradox (1967) is an argument against transworld identity with a reductio 
ad absurdum form. It is argued that, if one assumes transworld identity, then one is led 
to haecceitist switches. 
HAECCEITIST SWITCHdef = there are two possible worlds w1 and w2 (w1≠w2), 
such that R(B(w1))=R(B(w2)).
But, it is said, haecceitist switches are something utterly unacceptable, hence there is no 
identity across possible worlds. 
Modified (and a stronger) version of Chisholm’s paradox19 can be formulated as 
follows:
(8) Individuals exist across possible worlds (premise).
(9) There are two individuals Adam and Noah, such that all of Adam’s essential 
qualitative properties are those of Noah’s essential qualitative properties and 
vice versa (premise).
(10) There exist possible worlds w1 and w2 (w1≠w2) such that: (i) R(B(w1)) corres-
ponds to world-class C1, (ii) Adam exemplifies S1 and Noah exemplifies S2 in w1 
(where S1 and S2 are members of C1), (iii) R(B(w2)) corresponds to world-class 
C2, (iv) Adam exemplifies S2 and Noah exemplifies S1 in w2 (where S1 and S2 are 
members of C2) and (v) everything unrelated to Adam’s and Noah’s existence is 
the same in w1 and w2 (from (8) and (9)).
18 Similar definitions are given by Salmon (1996: 205-206).
19 Chisholm’s construal rests on transitivity of accessibility relations, i.e. on a frame condition that for all w, w1, 
w3,if wRw1 and w1Rw2, then wRw2. The modified version given in this article does not and hence it is stronger in the 
sense that fewer initial assumptions are needed.
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(11) R(B(w1))=R(B(w2)) (from (10)).
(12) It is not the case that there are haecceitist switches (premise).
Now, (11) and (12) are a contradiction, and (12) is by assumption true, hence (11) must 
be false. But, (11) was inferred only because (8) was accepted, therefore:
(13) ~ (8) (conclusion).
In the remainder of this section, two arguments against Chisholm’s paradox are de-
veloped. 
OBJECTION I: the thesis that there cannot be any haecceitist switches (viz. premise 
(12)) is grounded by reductionism. One can state that there are in fact no possible worlds 
that differ only non-qualitatively if and only if one does know that necessarily every 
world has a unique R(B(w)). But the truth of the metaphysical thesis of reductionism is 
not obvious and no convincing argument is given to support it. The burden of proof rests 
on the shoulders of those that propose it to be correct.
On the other hand, if reductionism is false, then (11) should be taken as a reason for 
accepting that individuals do have non-qualitative individual essences20. For consider:
(14) State of affairs Adam exists is included in w1 (premise).
(15) B(w1) implies Adam’s existence (from (14)).
(16) R(B(w1)) does not imply Adam’s existence (from (9))21.
(17) B(w1) has the same qualitative information as R(B(w1)).
Therefore,
(18) Non-qualitative propositions in B(w1) implies Adam’s existence (from (15), (16) 
and (17)).
Hence, if extreme haecceitism is true, one can know that non-qualitative truths in B(w1) 
implies Adam’s existence. But such non-qualitative truths are possible, only if Adam has 
a non-qualitative essence. Hence, if extreme haecceitism is true, then one should accept 
that Adam has a non-qualitative essence. One such essence could be a property “being-
identical-with-Adam”. Another, every world indexed property such that, it is uniquely 
instantiated by Adam in that possible world22.
E IS AN INDIVIDUAL ESSENCE OF Xdef = x has E necessarily and there is no 
possible world w in which there exists y, such that, x≠y and y has E.
20 As David Lewis puts it “one man‘s reason is another man‘s reductio” (1986: 207). An argument for extreme 
haecceitism would rest on the fact that if one can conceive Adam and Noah to switch all of their qualitative prop-
erties, then in fact they can. One should remain humble and confess that one simply does not know whether it is 
genuinely possible.
21 One could construct an argument that does not switch the roles of Adam and Noah but replaces one another. 
Hence, in w1 Adam will exemplify S1 and Noah will not exist but in w2 Noah will exemplify S1 and Adam will not 
exist.
22 These are non-qualitative essences favored by Plantinga, (1974: 71-77) (1976: 149-150).
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But then, the difference between w1 and w2 (from premise (10)) is grounded in the fact 
that in w1, some x such that essence of x is “being-identical-with-Adam” exemplifies S1 
and some y such that essence of y is “being-identical-with-Noah” exemplifies S2, whereas 
in w2 it is vice versa23. Therefore, if reductionism is false, then haecceitist switches are 
ontologically grounded, viz. even if qualitatively these worlds do not differ, they are 
different and properly so24.
OBJECTION II: for the sake of argument, one might suppose that proof of reductionism 
is given. But if so, then it would be implausible to accept premise (9), for the following 
reasons25. If reductionism is true, then (14) implies 
(19) R(B(w1)) implies Adam’s existence.
But R(B(w1)) assigns qualitative properties to variables, hence if it implies Adam’s 
existence, it must be the case that, some qualitative properties being exemplified by some 
x is sufficient for Adam’s existence. But now either exemplifying such a set of qualitative 
properties by some x is sufficient for Adam’s existence or it is sufficient and uniquely so. 
But it can’t be the former. For consider, if it is not unique, then there is some concrete con-
tingent individual I such that its sufficient conditions for existence are the same as Adam’s. 
But then the existence of I supervenes on the existence of Adam (and vice versa)26. In this 
paper, no principles of plenitude27 were introduced, but presumably, whatever they might 
be, they would rest on the fact that: existence of any two concrete contingent individuals 
does not supervene on one another28. But if there would be sufficient conditions for Adam’s 
existence that are not unique, then Adam’s existence would supervene on the existence of 
some other concrete contingent individual. But, Adam’s existence does not supervene on 
the existence of some other concrete contingent individual. Therefore, there are sufficient 
conditions for Adam’s existence that are unique. These conditions being satisfied in any 
possible world w implies Adam’s existence. Since these conditions are assignments of 
qualitative properties to variables, they are satisfied in a given possible world w if and 
only if Adam’s qualitative essence is exemplified by some x in that possible world w. 
23 Therefore, it is not the case that: “there may be good ground for the existentialist’s Angst; since, it would 
seem, God could have had no sufficient reason for choosing the world in which you play your present role instead 
of one in which you play mine” (Chisholm, 1967: 4).
24 This does not constitute any proof of extreme haecceitism, since there is no proof given of haecceitist switches. 
Even if “being-identical-with-Adam” is a property had only by Adam, one cannot infer that this property is separable 
from and in principle not reducible to qualitative properties. It might turn out that non-qualitative properties are, in 
a memorable phrase of Armstrong, “ontological free lunch” (1997: 13). But if it would be the case that all non-qual-
itative properties are reducible to qualitative properties, then (by definition of qualitative properties) these so-called 
“non-qualitative” properties are in fact qualitative.
25 Of course, one should take some generalization of premise (9) that does not involve Adam and Noah concretely. 
26 Viz. in all possible worlds there cannot be any difference of facts concerning Adam’s existence without there 
being any difference of facts concerning an individual’s I’s existence and vice versa.
27 Principles of plentitude should ensure that there are no gaps in logical space, e.g. “if there could be a dragon, 
and there could be a unicorn, but there couldn‘t be a dragon and a unicorn side by side, that would be an unacceptable 
gap in logical space, a failure of plenitude” (Lewis 1986: 88).
28 It should be added: for individuals that do not depend on one another in some essential ways. If one assumes 
biological origins essentialism, then principles of plenitude should not block Kripke’s essential dependence on his 
parents. 
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E IS A QUALITATIVE INDIVIDUAL ESSENCE OF Xdef = E is an individual 
essence of x and E is a property “exemplifying properties in a set A”, when A is the 
intersection of S1, S2, …, Sn (when S1, S2, …, Sn are qualitative profiles of x in all 
possible worlds where x exists)29.
But if reductionism and (14) imply (19), and the latter can be explained only by appeal 
to qualitative essences, then (9) is plainly false. If individuals have qualitative essences, 
then there are no two (numerically distinct) individuals such that sets of their qualitative 
essential properties are identical. But if so, then there are no haecceitist switches.
To conclude, Chisholm’s paradox does not raise any problems for transworld identity, 
since depending on whether extreme haecceitism or reductionism is true, individuals have 
either non-qualitative or qualitative essences. Therefore, one can resolve this paradox in a 
non-partisan way, i.e. by leaving it open as to whether individual essences are qualitative 
or not30.
5. Essentialist Solution to the Problem of Cross-World Identification
Another problem, that is said to haunt proponents of transworld identity, is associated 
with the criterion of identification of individuals across possible worlds. It is said, that one 
has to propose a criterion of cross-world identification in order to determine “transworld 
heir lines” (Kaplan 1979: 94). Criteria of adequacy for this criterion is – it must be given 
in terms of specified qualitative properties31. If one does not provide such a criterion of 
identification, then it is said one must conclude, as Quine does (1968: 313), that “we can 
make little sense of identification of particulars across possible worlds”. For it is:
odd to the point of paradoxicality to maintain that we can talk or think comprehendingly about 
things without knowing what it is that we are talking or thinking about—that is, without grasp-
ing their essences (Lowe 2008: 41/n33).
In the remainder of this section, two arguments are given: (i) for the appropriateness of 
reference to individual essences across possible worlds without knowing exactly what they 
are and (ii) against the criteria of adequacy for the criterion of cross-world identification. 
Regarding (i): one might compare the predicament, described by Lowe, with another 
situation. Imagine someone listening to a conversation between two mathematicians about 
some topological function called – “Fred”. Since the person listening does not have the 
necessary background to understand this function, she certainly does not know what it 
is. Because of their assurance to her, that everyone in the mathematics department agrees 
29 Qualitative essences as defined above are overloaded since they also include not unique necessary properties. 
What could qualitative essence of Adam be? Well, who knows. The only contention made in this section is that, if 
reductionism is true, then Adam has a qualitative essence.
30 Platinga also considers the possibility of remaining agnostic, with respect as to whether individual essences 
are qualitative or not (1974: 100-101). On the other hand, elsewhere, he explicitly accepts thisness, i.e., in the termi-
nology of this article, non-qualitative essences, cf. Platinga (1974: 71-77) (1976: 149-150).
31 Cf. Kripke (1980: 44); Plantinga (1974: 93); Salmon (1996: 207); Kaplan (1979: 99).
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what this function is, she infers that Fred has an essence even if she does not know what 
this essence is. But surely, when she formulates propositions concerning Fred, she is 
talking about it32.
Alike with individuals. One can know that Kripke exists and one’s knowledge of that 
fact allows one to infer that there must be an essence of Kripke (as argued in section 
4)33. Agnosticism regarding whether individual essences are qualitative or non-qual-
itative (viz. whether extreme haecceitism or reductionism is true) should not prevent 
one from thinking about individual essences, because obviously, Kripke has a property 
“being-identical-with-Kripke”. When one ponders as to whether reductionism or extreme 
haecceitism is true, then ultimately one is considering whether this essence of Kripke is 
referent-dependent on qualitative properties or not. The very intelligibility of arguing for 
either side rests on a prior fact that there is some such essence to be considered. But if 
so, then one is thinking about Kripke’s essence after all and hence, one can appropriately 
refer to it across possible worlds. If someone wants to specify worlds that include Kripke, 
she just says that she is doing so.
 On the other hand, if one were to stipulate a possible world where Kripke has a property 
of being an anteater, then it might be the case that, Kripke’s essence is incompatible with 
this property being co-exemplified with it and, hence it is impossible for such a world to 
obtain. Of course, if one were to commit oneself to the task of listing all metaphysically 
possible worlds where Kripke exists, then one would have to prove either extreme haec-
ceitism or reductionism and specify all of Kripke’s essences, essential and accidental 
properties. But that is unnecessary for the intelligibility of transworld identity. One might 
better take sides with Inwagen and say, that these questions:
are better described as metaphysical questions about individuals (…) that are couched in terms 
of trans-world identity. To call them questions about trans-world identity is like calling the 
question whether the truth of materialism commits one to the truth of determinism a question 
about truth (1985: 116).
Regarding (ii): the idea behind criteria of adequacy for the criterion of cross-world 
identification seems to be the following: having a set of specified qualitative properties, 
one could, for any possible world, check whether or not it’s R(B(w)) includes their ex-
emplification. Of course, this criteria of adequacy presupposes reductionism. If extreme 
haecceitism is true, then individuals are individuated by non-qualitative essences and 
hence it is wrong to assert that criterion of cross-world identification must be given in 
terms of qualitative properties.
On the other hand, what if reductionism is true? Well, it still seems that it is not neces-
sary to specify qualitative properties that individuate individuals in order to refer to them 
across possible worlds. If proof of reductionism were given, then one would know that 
32 The example is taken from Plantinga (1974: 86)
33 It would be another question whether or not, one can refer to and know that there are essences of not yet exist-
ing objects.
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Kripke has a qualitative essence and hence one could refer to this essence of Kripke. This 
situation is not dissimilar to the following one described by Salmon. When one declares that
I am discussing cities with marble monuments. I do not have to specify the relevant class 
of cities purely qualitatively and then provide a criterion for intercity identity of material. I 
simply select the class of cities that I wish to discuss by specifying that they have monuments 
made of . . . , well, marble (1996: 210).
Similarly, for possible worlds. One chooses to specify such and such possible world 
for our attention and it need not be specified by qualitative properties only, even if re-
ductionism is true34. For: 
[p]ossible worlds’ are stipulated, not discovered by powerful telescopes. There is no reason 
why we cannot stipulate that, in talking about what would have happened to Nixon in a cer-
tain counterfactual situation, we are talking about what would have happened to him” (Kripke 
1980: 44).
6. Conclusions
In this paper, it was argued that:
1. Transworld identity betters both global pan-essentialism and counterpart theory because 
the former does but neither of the latter do, account accidental properties.
2. Chisholm’s paradox does not raise any problem for transworld identity. That is so 
because either extreme haeceitism or reductionism is true. But if the former is true, 
then individuals have non-qualitative essences and, hence haecceitist switches are 
ontologically grounded. On the other hand, if reductionism is true, then individuals 
have qualitative essences and it is impossible for two distinct individuals to have the 
same essential qualitative properties, and hence there are no haecceitist switches.
3. Cross-world identification of individuals does not raise any problem for transworld 
identity. Criteria of adequacy for this criterion is incorrect since it is appropriate to 
refer to individuals across possible worlds without specifying qualitative properties that 
individuate them (even if there are such properties). That is so because it is appropriate 
to refer to individuals across possible worlds by referring to their essences35.
Bibliography
Adams, R., 1974. Theories of Actuality. Noûs 8(3): 211-231. DOI: doi:10.2307/2214751
Armstrong, D. M., 1997. A World of States of Affairs. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. DOI: 10.1017/
CBO9780511583308
34 Similarly, Kripke (1980: 18/n17) says: “[w]hat I defend is the propriety of giving possible worlds in terms of 
certain particular as well as qualitatively, whether or not there are in fact qualitatively identical but distinct worlds.”
35 The present paper has greatly benefited from the helpful comments of Živilė Pabijutaitė and anonymous 
reviewers. Also, shout-out to Jennifer Purdy at Department of Linguistics and Philosophy (MIT) for managing a 
digitalization of Kenneth Siegel’s Ph.D. thesis on request. 
ISSN 1392-1126   eISSN 2424-6158   PROBLEMOS 99, 2021
100
Brandom, R., 2005. Responses to Pippin, Macbeth and Haugeland. European Journal of Philosophy 13(3): 
429-41. DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-0378.2005.00238.x
Brandom, R., 2019. A Spirit of Trust: a Reading of Hegel’s Phenomenology. Cambridge, MA London: The 
Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
Chisholm, R., 1967. Identity Through Possible Worlds: Some Questions. Noûs 1(1): 1-8. DOI: 10.2307/2214708
Cover, J., & Hawthorne, J., 1992. Leibnizian Essentialism, Transworld Identity, and Counterparts. History of 
Philosophy Quarterly 9(4): 425-444.
Cowling, S., 2011. Identity and the Limits of Possibility (Ph.D. thesis). Open Access Dissertations. 435. https://
scholarworks.umass.edu/open_access_dissertations/435
Hegel, G. W. F., 1977. Phenomenology of Spirit. Transl. by A. Miller. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Kaplan, D., 1967/1979. Transworld Heir Lines. In: The Possible and the Actual, eds. M. Loux. 88–109. Ithaca, 
NY: Cornell University Press.
Kripke S., 1980. Naming and Necessity. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press. 
Lewis, D., 1970. How to Define Theoretical Terms. The Journal of Philosophy 67(13): 427-446. DOI: 
10.2307/2023861
Lewis, D., 1973. Counterfactuals, Oxford: Blackwell.
Lewis, D., 1986. On the Plurality of Worlds. Cambridge, MA: Blackwell.
Lowe, E. J., 2008. Two Notions of Being: Entity and Essence. Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 62: 
23–48. DOI: 10.1017/s1358246108000568 
McDaniel, K., 2004. Modal Realism with Overlap. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 82(1): 137–152. DOI: 
10.1080/713659792 
Plantinga, A., 1974. The Nature of Necessity. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Plantinga, A., 1976. Actualism and Possible Worlds. Theoria 42: 139-160. DOI: doi.org/10.1111/j.1755-2567.1976.
tb00681.x
Roca-Royes, S., 2011. Essential Properties and Individual Essences. Philosophy Compass 6(1): 65–77. DOI: 
10.1111/j.1747-9991.2010.00364.x 
Rowe, W., 1979. The Problem of Evil and Some Varieties of Atheism. American Philosophical Quarterly 16(4): 
335-341. 
Quine, W. V. O., 1948. On What There Is. The Review of Metaphysics, 2(5): 21-38.
Quine, W. V. O., 1968. Replies. Synthese, 19(1/2): 264-322.
Salmon, N., 1982. Reference and Essence. Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press.
Salmon, N., 1989. The Logic of What Might Have Been. The Philosophical Review 98(1): 3-34. DOI: 
10.2307/2185369
Salmon, N., 1996. Trans-World Identification and Stipulation. Philosophical Studies 84(2/3): 203-223. DOI: 
10.1007/BF00354487
Siegel, K. H., 1975. Identity Across Possible Worlds (Ph.D. thesis). Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
Scott, D., 1970. Advice on Modal Logic. In: Philosophical Problems in Logic: Some Recent Developments, 
ed. K. Lambert, 143–173. Dordrecht: Reidel. DOI: 10.1007/978-94-010-3272-8
van Inwagen, P., 1980. Indexicality and Actuality. The Philosophical Review 89(3): 403-426. DOI: 
10.2307/2184396
van Inwagen P., 1985. Plantinga on Trans-World Identity. In: Alvin Plantinga. Profiles (An International Series 
on Contemporary Philosophers and Logicians), vol 5, eds. Tomberlin J.E., van Inwagen P. Dordrecht: 
Riedel. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-5223-2_2
Williamson, T., 2013. Modal Logic as Metaphysics. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
